Discussions about simulation are of extreme interest to me.
Very interesting is to understand that enaction somehow introduces the idea
of embodiment in processes of perception and knowledge acquisition. My
interpretation follows Varela's and Maturama's need to involve the subject
in significant experiences, that obviously cannot be perceived by the
individual as simulatory. Otherwise, enaction would not happen. I face this
as reiterating the need to integrate artistic experience as non-dissociated
Of course, discourse shifts a bit when concerning emulations of the brain.
The brain as a representational system as neuroscience tends to describe it.
Fortunatly, human beings are not 'a brain', as concepts such as enaction
urge to establish. I believe we are product of the interaction between our
constituve parts, such as body-mind, and external context. A complex system,
as Clarissa would put it, I believe.
Undeniably, emulation processes are extremely important in the understanding
of how the brain integrates/represents/inter-relates emotional/bodly
experiences with 'rational' behaviour. The basis of all Damasio's
Phantom limb based experiences such the ones that Ehrcsson has been
conducting, on body ownership 'simulations' - apparently product of brain
emulations-, really break some new ground in the dissolution of the
boundaries between simulation and reality.
Luis Miguel Girão
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